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DCS Reference: Air Defences, Eastern

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Italicised units — ones with their number in parenthesis — are optional and not necessary for the functioning of the system. Beyond that, the numbers listed only indicate the doctrinal setups and all systems only require one of each mandatory unit to work if the mission designer wants to reduce the overall unit count. Units (mainly decorative) that can be found outside the Air Defence category have their category indicated in parentheses, as do decorations that only exist as static objects. For some of the more advanced systems, it is good practice to make the command post unit the first unit in the group, but some scripting setups such as Skynet-IADS will require specific units to be the the first one in the group in order for the scripting to work.

Naming conventions

To fully understand what different systems do and what their purpose is, one has to dive into the murky world of GRAU indices — the Russian equivalent of the JETDS or AN-system. Three general groups and naming schemes are relevant to keep track of:

  • The 2K series — the air defences that for one reason or another classify as artillery (the index number 2) anti-air systems (the ‘K’ category). Ostensibly, this signifies tactical air defence units that are deployed to protect a given (smaller) area. This can be contrasted against 2A category, where the A means it is a towed system.
  • The 9K series — army missile (index 9) anti-air systems (again ‘K’). The army categorisation implies that these are more mobile units that are deployed to protect various army detachment rather than specific points. The actual missiles themselves are categorised as 9M, the individual launchers as 9A, and command units as 9S.
  • The S- series — multi-part strategic (hence the ‘S’) defence system that, while they might have some mobility, are set up to defend large swaths of strategically important airspace. The number after the S signifies a nominal protection radius in kilometres. Individual pieces within this larger system will have their own GRAU indices, but that's of less relevance for the system name as a whole.

To add to the confusion, there is often a lot of overlap between these schemes as different components of each system will themselves have specific GRAU codes and of course, on top of this is the often more familiar NATO reporting names for each system. The NATO names have a logic of their own, commonly using “SA” to signify a Surface to Air system, and a number that essentially works as a chronological index — the SA-2 was made (or at least officially acknowledged) before the SA-3; SA-10 came out slightly before SA-11, and so on.

Picking an early-detection system

A look through the setups listed below will reveal that many systems have the option to use one of two different detection systems: the P-19 search radar or the Sborka reconnaissance/command centre/air defence radar. This includes a number of IR- and optically guided systems. The choice to use these two units is a bit of a compromise.

On the one hand, including them lets the group detect enemies early and have more time to change their level of readiness, letting them fire as soon as the target is in weapon range. On the other hand, this will give early warning to the target as well, which for some IR systems in particular might defeat the whole purpose of using a sneaky passive targeting system. On the third hand, since so many different systems use the same two detection units, it can be hard for the attacker to figure out the exact nature of what is about to shoot at them — if all you see is eight different “Dog Ear” cues on the RWR, you will not know if those are aiming SA-13 IR missiles, SA-15 radar missiles, or SA-19 optically guided missiles in your general direction (until it is too late). It also gives anti-radiation missiles more emitters to try to resolve or accidentally lock on to, wasting precious ordnance on something that does not actually reduce the threat for aircraft in the area.

From a mission-design standpoint, DCS' automated briefing screen will unfortunately give a lot of this away and ruin the surprise, as will the faked SA data loading that is integrated in aircraft such as the F-16, F/A-18, and Ka-50. Two mission editor options exist to “hide on planning screen” and “hide on MFD” that are supposed to suppress this free intel, but this functionality is unreliably and unevenly implemented in the different modules.

Radar-guided

2K12 Kub / SA-6 “Gainful”

The SA-6 is a Soviet Mobile Medium range SAM developed in 1958 intended to cover ground forces from aerial attack.

2K12 Kub / SA-6 “Gainful”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SAM SA-6 Kub STR 9S91 1 1S91 “Straight Flush” Search/Track Radar Detection: 0.5–37.8nm / 1–70km
Altitude: 65–45,900ft / 20–14,000m
RWR-6.pngPO1-Medium.png
SAM SA-6 Kub LN 2P25 4 Transporter Erector Launcher 3× 3M9M Engagement: 2.2–13.5nm / 4–25km
Altitude: 98–26,500ft / 30–8,000m
Max speed: Mach 2.2
SAM SR P-19 (1) P-19 Danube 1RL134 / “Flat Face B” Search Radar Detection: 0.8–86.4nm / 1.5–160km
Altitude: 82–98,400ft / 25–30,000m
RWR-FF.pngPO1-Medium.png
(Armor) APC BTR-80 (1) Site Survey Vehicle
(Unarmed) CP SKP-11 ATC Mobile Command Post (1) Radio Relay Van
(Unarmed) CP Ural-375 PBU (1) Radar Test/repair Station
(Unarmed) Transport GAZ-66 (1) Transporter/transloader
(Unarmed) Transport KAMAZ-43101 (2) Missile Transporter
(Unarmed) Transport ZIL-131 KUNG (1) Repair/test/assembly Station
(Static Cargos) ISO container small (8) Missile reloads
Reload / rearm 5s to ready new missile; 600s per missile to reload;
1800s total rearm time per launcher from a depleted state.
Acquisition time STR: 1s scan + 20s acquisition.
SR: 6s scan + 9s acquisition.
Acquisition limits STR lock-on: 32.1nm / 59.5km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
SR lock-on: 73nm / 136km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
Target tracking STR can guide 2 missiles at a time at a single target.
Target size limit 0.18m².[1]
Sensor scan coverage STR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
SR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+45° vertical.
Time to ready 2s (all components)
Kill radius 12m
Notes
The optional components are mostly for decoration (especially the static cargo containers), although the many transport units will provide rearming functionality for the launchers.

Adding an optional P-19 radar extends the search range but may tip off the target early and reduces the site's mobility.

The system is mobile but relies in multiple components and cannot be directly driven using Combined Arms.

Available to
Abkhazia, but only with historical units turned off Algeria, from 1982 Angola, from 1983 Belarus, but only with historical units turned off Bulgaria, from 1976 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Cuba, from 1982 Czech Republic, from 1993 East Germany, from 1976 to 1990 Egypt, from 1972 Ethiopia, from 1973 Hungary, from 1974 India, from 1977 Iran, from 1995 Iraq, from 1977 to 2003 Kazakhstan, from 1991 Libya, from 1974 Poland, from 1973 Romania, from 1980 Russia, from 1991 Serbia, from 2006 Slovakia, from 1993 Syria, from 1973 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1967 to 1991 Yemen, from 1979 Yugoslavia, from 1971 to 1991 Vietnam, from 1979
Tactics
This system was designed to be a mobile point defence system to protect ground forces from aerial attack, as such it can move with them and set up within 15 minutes. It is also employed as static point defence around important installations. Soviet doctrine places one SA-6 regiment (5 sites) per tank division.

Missiles are initially guided by remote command, becoming SARH in the terminal phase. The "Straight Flush" is equipped with both a tracking radar and an optical sight, making it a real life possibility to launch and guide until the terminal phase, minimizing RWR warning time and SEAD vulnerability. The possibility of a DCS SA-6 AI of any skill level or scripted behaviour doing this is unconfirmed.

9K33 Osa / SA-8 “Gecko”

Developed in 1971, this short range low altitude SAM is highly mobile and makes for a dangerous escort for ground forces or complement to other defences.

9K33 Osa / SA-8 “Gecko”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SAM SA-8 Osa 9A33 4 Transporter Erector Launcher And Radar 6× 9M33 Detection: 0.8–16.2nm / 1.5–30km
Detection alt.: 32–16,400ft / 10–5,000m
RWR-08.pngPO1-Short.png
Low alt. engagement: 0.8–4.6nm / 1.5–8.5km
High alt. engagement: 0.8–5.5nm / 1.5–10.3km
Engagement alt.: 32–16,400ft / 10–5,000m
Max speed: Mach 2.1
CP 9S80M1 Sborka (0-1) PPRU-M1 / “Dog Ear” command unit Detection: 0.1–18.9nm / 0.1–35km
Altitude: 50–32,800ft / 15–10,000m
RWR-DE.pngPO1-Short.png
(Unarmed) CP Ural-375 PBU (1) TELAR Calibration and simulation
(Unarmed) Fuel Truck ATZ-10 (1) Tanker
(Unarmed) Transport KAMAZ-43101 (1) Loading Crane
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-375 (1) Transporter/transloader[2]
(Unarmed) Transport ZIL-131 KUNG (1) Repair/test/assembly Station
Reload / rearm 4s to ready new missile; 300s reload per missile;
1800s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time TELAR: 1s scan + 18s acquisition.
CP: 1s scan + 12s acquisition.
Acquisition limits TELAR lock-on: 13.8nm / 25.5km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
CP lock-on: 16nm / 30km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
Target tracking TELAR can guide 2 missiles at a time at a single target.
Target size limit 0.22m².[1]
No evidence that the CP can share target tracks.
Sensor scan coverage TELAR radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
TELAR “Karat” optics: 360° horizontal × -3°–+27° vertical.
CP: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Aiming limits Visual: 360° horizontal × -12°–+70° vertical.
Time to ready 2s
Kill radius 5m
Notes
The addition of an optional “Dog Ear” radar can extend detection range, though it may be undesirable due to the lack of emissions control and will tip off the target early.

Soviet doctrine is to place a regiment of SA-8 (5 sites) within a motor-rifle division.

The system is mobile and can be directly driven using Combined Arms.

Available to
Abkhazia, but only with historical units turned off Algeria, from 1980 Angola, from 1987 Belarus, from 1991 Bulgaria, from 1985 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Cuba, from 1980 Czech Republic, from 1993 East Germany, from 1981 to 1990 Georgia, from 1991 Germany, from 1990 to 1992 Greece, from 1994 India, from 1984 Iraq, from 1982 Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Libya, from 1981 Poland, from 1980 Russia, from 1991 South Ossetia, from 2008 Sudan, from 2014 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1971 to 1991
Tactics
Each TELAR has both a radar and optical sight intended for searching, ranging, and tracking targets as well as for missile guidance, but the unit as represented in DCS is only ever radar-operated since ECM is not sufficient to render the radar useless.

Can lock incoming missiles but only has limited self-defence anti-missile capability in this manner. Human controllers and scripters might consider to instead just turn off the radar and scoot out of the way in event of a perceived SEAD attack. It can track while on the move, but must stop in order to fire. Shoot and scoot tactics can make this unit a very elusive target for SEAD aircraft: units adopting this tactic would be better engaged by a maverick or high altitude laser guided bomb.

9K37 Buk M1 / SA-11 “Gadfly”

The 1980's successor to the SA-6, this medium range SAM can be extremely hard to kill.

9K37 Buk M1 / SA-11 “Gadfly”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SAM SA-11 Buk CC 9S470M1 1 Self Propelled Command Centre Detection: 1.1–54nm / 2–100km
Altitude: 49–82,000ft / 15–25,000m[3]
SAM SA-11 Buk SR 9S18M1 1 “Snow Drift” Acquisition Radar (search) Detection: 1.1–54nm / 2–100km
Altitude: 82–82,000ft / 25–25,000m
RWR-SD.pngPO1-Medium.png
SAM SA-11 Buk LN 9A310M1 4-6 “Fire Dome” Transporter Erector Launcher And Radar 4× 9M38M1 Detection: 1.6–27nm / 3–50km
Detection alt.: 65–72,100ft / 20–22,000m
RWR-11.pngPO1-Medium.png
Low alt. engagement: 1.8–13.8nm / 3.3–25.5km
High alt. engagement: 1.8–18.9nm / 3.3–35km
Engagement alt.: 49–72,100ft / 15–22,000m
Max speed: Mach 3.4
(Unarmed) GPU APA-5D on Ural-4320 (1) PES-100T Mobile Power Generator
(Unarmed) Transport KAMAZ-43101 (2) Missile Reload Transporter
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-375 (1) 9T31M1 Self Propelled Crane
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-4320-31 Armored (1) 9V881M1 Equipment Repair/Test Station
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-4320-31 Armored (1) 9V883M1 Equipment Repair Station
(Unarmed) Transport ZIL-131 KUNG (1) 9V95M1 Mobile Automatic Test Station
(Static Cargos) ISO container small (2) Missile releoads
Reload / rearm 5s to ready new missile; 195s reload per missile;
780s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time CC: 0.1s
SR: 1s scan + 14s acquisition.
TELAR: 1s scan + 20s search acquisition; 4s lock-on for search targets (self-designated or designated by CC).
Acquisition limits SR lock-on: 45.9nm / 85km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
TELAR lock-on: 19.4nm / 36km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
Target tracking CC can track 10 targets at a time, fed by SR.
SR can track 10 targets at a time.
TELAR can guide 2 missiles per target at a time; can track 1 self-designated target + 1 CC-designated target.
Target size limit 0.18m².[1]
Sensor scan coverage SR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
TELAR STR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
TELAR “Karat” optics: 360° horizontal × -3°–+27° vertical.
Time to ready: CC: 20s
SR: 60s
TELAR: 15s
Kill radius 13m
Notes
Has limited self-defence anti-missile capability. The launch unit depicted is the TELAR model with its own tracking radar, and it can operate independently in a very limited capacity if the CC and SR units have been destroyed but requires both to actually fire in any coordinated fashion.

A single TELAR can be deployed and function without CC and SR units, but will rely on optical search to find its targets, and can take severla minutes to complete a full sweep of its detection area. The same holds true if the CC and SR units are destroyed before they can be readied and have not yet provided a target for the TELAR to track.

The system is mobile but consists of multiple interdependent components and cannot be directly driven using Combined Arms.

Available to
Abkhazia, but only with historical units turned off Algeria, but only with historical units turned off Belarus, from 1991 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Egypt, from 2007 Finland, from 1996 Georgia, from 2007 Iran, but only with historical units turned off Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Russia, from 1991 Serbia, but only with historical units turned off Syria, from 1986 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1983 to 1991
Tactics
Like the SA-6, this mobile system is designed to move with and cover other ground forces from air attack. As such, many of its upgrades are in the form of the ability to fire on missiles.

SEAD aircraft should be aware that each launcher has its own redundant tracking radar, and will take a ton of ARMs to bring down targeting tracking emitters. Instead, it is better to fire a salvo at the search emitter, as the loss of the search emitter or the command post will largely render the site inoperative unless you fly in very close proximity to the remaining TELARs.

Per Soviet Doctrine, 1 SA-11 brigade (12 sites) is deployed within an army.

9K331 Tor / SA-15 “Gauntlet”

Introduced in 1986 as a successor to the SA-8, this unit is even more of an annoying ankle biter than its predecessor.

9K331 Tor / SA-15 “Gauntlet”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SAM SA-15 Tor 9A331 4 Transporter Erector Launcher And Radar 8× 9M331 Detection: 0.3–13.5nm / 0.5–25km
Detection alt.: 65–26,200ft / 20–8,000m
RWR-15.pngPO1-Short.png
Engagement: 0.8–6.5nm / 1.5–12km
Engagement alt.: 32–19,700ft / 10–6,000m
Max speed: Mach 3.0
CP 9S80M1 Sborka (0-1) PPRU-M1 / “Dog Ear” command unit Detection: 0.1–18.9nm / 0.1–35km
Altitude: 50–32,800ft / 15–10,000m
RWR-DE.pngPO1-Short.png
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-4320-31 Armored (1) Missile Transporter/transloader
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-4320-31 Armored (1) Test/repair/assembly station
Reload / rearm 4s to ready new missile; 540s reload per batch of 4 missiles;
1080s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time TELAR: 1s scan + 6s acquisition.
CP: 1s scan + 12s acquisition.
Acquisition limits TELAR lock-on: 11.5nm / 21.3km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
CP lock-on: 16nm / 30km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
Target tracking TELAR can guide 2 missiles at a time at a single target.
Target size limit 0.02m².[1]
No evidence that the CP can share target tracks.
Sensor scan coverage TELAR radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
TELAR optics: 360° horizontal × -3°–+70° vertical.
CP: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Aiming limits Visual: 360° horizontal × -4°–+85° vertical.
Time to ready TELAR: 10s
CP: 2s
Kill radius 7m
Notes
Has highly capable self-defence anti-missile capability. In pure numbers, no missile should be able to evade it, but in practice, due to reaction times and locking limits, smaller ones (effective size 0.03m² and down) will usually get through.

The addition of an optional “Dog Ear” radar can extend detection range, though it may be undesirable due to the lack of emissions control and will tip off the target early.

The system is mobile and can be directly driven using Combined Arms.

Available to
Belarus, from 1991 China, from 1991 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Egypt, from 2005 Greece, from 1999 Iran, from 2006 Kazakhstan, from 1991 Ukraine, from 1991 Russia, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1991 to 1991 Venezuela, from 2007
Tactics
Each TELAR has both a radar and optical sight intended for searching, ranging, and tracking targets as well as for missile guidance, but the unit as represented in DCS is only ever radar-operated since ECM is not sufficient to render the radar useless.

Improved ability to engage incoming missiles, enabling the possibility of covering units from air attack and SEAD, or playing with the sorts of annoying shoot and scoot tactics the SA-8 can accomplish. The one Achilles heel it retains is that it needs to stop to shoot.

In terms of soviet doctrine, a regiment of SA-15 (4 sites) replaces SA-6 or SA-8s within Tanks or Motor-Rifle divisions.

9S80M1 Sborka-M1 (PPRU-M1) / “Dog Ear”

The PPRU-1 mobile reconnaissance and air defence control point was introduced in the late 1970s as a unified way to coordinate mobile tactical air defence batteries such as the Shilka, Strela-1, Strela-10, Tor and Tunguska.

9S80M1 Sborka-M1 (PPRU-M1) / “Dog Ear”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
CP 9S80M1 Sborka 1 9S80M1 Sborka / “Dog Ear” command unit Detection: 0.1–18.9nm / 0.1–35km
Altitude: 50–32,800ft / 15–10,000m
RWR-DE.pngPO1-Short.png
Acquisition time 1s scan + 12s acquisition.
Acquisition limits Radar: 16nm / 30km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
Target tracking Can track 10 targets at a time.
Target size limit 0.18m².[1]
There is no evidence that the Sborka can share target tracks with other units.
Sensor scan coverage Radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Time to ready 2s
Notes
The system has no offensive (or defensive) capabilities but is solely intended to augment AI unit early-warning detection capabilities. It cannot be driven using Combined Arms.
Available to
Abkhazia, but only with historical units turned off Algeria, but only with historical units turned off Belarus, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Georgia, but only with historical units turned off Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Russia, from 1991 Ukraine, but only with historical units turned off United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1978 to 1991
Tactics
Since this is entirely a support unit — it presents no threat and cannot really protect against anything, the Sborka may seem like a completely harmless thing. It still creates issues, however. For one, when attached to any of the units it is supposed to support, it lets enemy units detect the player earlier and lets them be ready sooner. In some cases, this may seem like a disadvantage since IR-based systems like the Strelas or Iglas would otherwise not show up on the player's RWR. But on the other hand, given the breadth of units that it is supposedly attached to, this creates a problem: you have no idea what is hiding behind that RWR blip. It may just be some low-level AAA, but it might also suddenly flip over into showing an SA-15 site, or it might show nothing and out of nowhere you are yet another Tunguska victim.

It also creates problem for SEAD/DEAD aircraft since it creates another emitter that the ARM:s might go after and which needs to be resolved, filtered out, and separated from more worth-while targets.

HQ-7 / 红旗-7 “Red Banner”

HQ-7 / 红旗-7 “Red Banner”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
HQ-7 Self-Propelled LN 3 Launch Unit 4× HQ-7 Detection: 0.1–10.8nm / 0.2–20km
Detection alt.: 0–18,000ft / 0–5,500m
RWR-7.pngPO1-Short.png
Engagement: 0.3–6.5nm / 0.5–12km
Engagement alt.: 98–18,000ft / 30–5,500m
Max speed: Mach 2.5
HQ-7 Self-Propelled STR (1) Search (and Track) Unit Detection: 0.3–16.2nm / 0.5–30km
Altitude: 32–18,000ft / 10–5,500m
RWR-HQ.pngPO1-Medium.png
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-4320-31 Armored (4) Support/maintenance group
Reload / rearm 1s to ready new missile; 240s reload per missiles;
960s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time LN: 5s scan + 5s acquisition.
STR: 1s scan + 10s acquisition.
Acquisition limits LN lock-on: 3.4–5.2nm / 6.4–9.6km.[4] Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
STR lock-on: 14nm / 27km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
Target tracking LN can guide 1 missile at a time at a single target.
STR can guide 4 missiles per target and can track 2 targets at once.
Target size limit 0.12m².[1]
Sensor scan coverage LN radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
STR radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Aiming limits Visual: 360° horizontal × -5°–+45° vertical.
Time to ready 2s
Kill radius 7m Countermeasure resistance factor ×3
Notes
In spite of the naming scheme, the launcher vehicle has full search-and-track capabilities on its own and is not reliant on the STR to detect or engage targets — it just does it slower and at shorter ranges.

Has nominal capabilities to engage larger cruise- and anti-ship missiles, but its target altitude limit will not let missiles reliably track sea-skimming targets.

The system is mobile and can be directly driven using Combined Arms, including the STR, which provides a huge radar scope as its main viewpoint.

Available to
Algeria, but only with historical units turned off China, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Pakistan, but only with historical units turned off United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off
Tactics
The HQ-7 in many ways operates like a more capable SA-8 / Osa. It has similar targeting and engagement limits, but is much less affected by countermeasures, and the addition of an STR unit should allow it to more quickly switch between multiple targets. Still, flying high or engaging with stand-off weapons will hit its weak spots much like with the Osa.

A typical HQ-7 battalion consists of 3 operational sections, each with 3 launchers and 1 search radar, and 1 support section with 10 support vehicles and a maintenance group.

S-75M1 Divina / SA-2 “Guideline”

Typical Layout of an SA 2 (minus static or non-functional objects). Includes Shilkas and an Igla team to cover against low approaches.

The SA-2 is a Soviet Radar guided medium range high altitude SAM system developed in 1957, but continues to see use to this day. The missiles are given remote commands from a ground operator, effectively making them Semi-Active Radar Homing.

S-75M1 Divina / SA-2 “Guideline”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SAM SR P-19 1 P-19 Danube 1RL134 / “Flat Face B” Search Radar Detection: 0.8–86.4nm / 1.5–160km
Altitude: 82–98,400ft / 25–30,000m
RWR-FF.pngPO1-Medium.png
SAM SA-2 TR SNR-75 Fan Song 1 “Fan Song” Tracking Radar Detection: 0.8–54nm / 1.5–100km
Altitude: 82–82,000ft / 25–25,000m
RWR-2.pngRWR-FS.pngPO1-Medium.png
SAM SA-2 LN SM-90 6 Single-rail Launcher 1× 13DAM (V-755) Low alt. engagement: 3.8–21.6nm / 7–40km
High alt. engagement: 3.8–16.2nm / 7–30km
Altitude: 328–65,600ft / 100–20,000m
Max speed: Mach 3.0
(Unarmed) CP SKP-11 ATC Mobile Command Post (1) Radio Relay Van
(Unarmed) CP Ural-375 PBU (1) SNR-75 Radar Operation Van
(Unarmed) CP Ural-375 PBU (1) SNR-75 Radar Electronics Van
(Unarmed) GPU APA-80 on ZiL-131 (1) ESP-90 Power generator
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-375 (1-6) Transporter/transloader
(Static Cargos) Fuel Tank (2) 5L22A Fuel Tank
(Static Cargos) Oiltank (2) 5L62A Oxidiser Tank
(Unavailable) Rapier FSA Blindfire Tracker (1) RV-10 Konus Heightfinding Radars Detection 0.3–16.2nm / 0.5–30km
Altitude: 164–13,100ft / 50–4,000m
RWR-RT.pngPO1-Short.png
Reload / rearm 2700s per missile to reload.
Acquisition time SR: 6s scan + 9s acquisition.
TR: 1s scan + 20s acquisition.
HFR: 1s scan + 6s acquisition.
Acquisition limits SR lock-on: 73nm / 136km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
TR lock-on: 41.3nm / 76.5km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
HFR lock-on: 11.5nm / 21.3km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
Target tracking SR can track 10 targets at a time.
TR can can guide 2 missiles at a time at a single target.
Target size limit 0.18m².[1]
Sensor scan coverage SR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+45° vertical.
TR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
HFR radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
HFR optics: 360° horizontal × -3°–+70° vertical.
Time to ready 2s (all components)
Kill radius 20m
Notes
While the radar is ostensibly capable of limited missile tracking, the locking time and the missile guidance will never allow for an actual egagement.

The optional components are mostly for decoration (especially the static cargo containers), although the many transport units will provide rearming functionality for the launchers.

The Rapier Blindfire Tracker is a good visual representation of the height-finding radar, but is commonly unavailable to countries that possess the SA-2 and would probably interfere with detection mechanics if mixed in — a better solution is to add it as a Static Ground Vehicle object.

The system is static and cannot be driven using Combined Arms.

Available to
Algeria, from 1966 Angola, from 1976 Bulgaria, from 1962 China, from 1961 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Cuba, from 1961 Czech Republic, but only with historical units turned off East Germany, from 1962 Egypt, from 1963 Ethiopia, from 1977 Georgia, from 1991 Germany, but only with historical units turned off Hungary, from 1961 India, from 1963 Indonesia, from 1961 Iran, from 1961 Iraq, from 1963 Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Libya, from 1974 North Korea, from 1962 Pakistan, from 1966 Poland, from 1963 Romania, from 1963 Russia, from 1991 Slovakia, from 1993 Sudan, from 1971 Syria, from 1967 Ukraine, but only with historical units turned off United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1961 to 1991 Vietnam, from 1965 Yemen, from 1979 Yugoslavia, from 1962
Tactics
Soviet doctrinal placements of units are in a flower pattern, with sensors/logistics units at the center and launchers arranged an a circle around them spaced no more than a few hundred feet apart. However, this is a very easy arrangement to spot from the air, so guerrilla forces throughout history have been known to use other arrangements for the sake of concealment. Since reuse of sites is a common practice, these rules are frequently applied to newer SAM batteries, as well.

One of the easier systems to evade, the tracking radar is easily fooled via notching and chaff bursts of at minimum 4 per second. Chaff on its own is 3× more likely than normal to spoof the V-755. Missiles have no guidance of their own: defeat the track radar to defeat the missile. Missiles guidance is fairly stupid, and can be dragged into the ground. It is also completely unable to track targets at sub 300 ft altitudes, leaving it vulnerable to low runs. As a result, sites should also include short range anti-air able to engage at low altitudes, such as AAA guns and MANPADS.

But more than that, Eagle Dynamics have in their infinite wisdom decided that the weapon system that forced an entire new air war doctrine and mission tasking, with specialised aircraft, weapon systems, defensive systems, and specialist schools to be developed to combat it, is pretty much just a pop gun. Due to the SA-2 in DCS only using pure pursuit rather than any kind of proportional or otherwise predictive navigation, it can be defeated by flying straight and level at above 300kts, making it a threat to A-10s, a few helicopters, and not much else, and those can generally quite easily fly below its engagement altitude. Any kind of fighter aircraft or jet bomber or even most transports are completely untouchable by this weapon system.

S-125 Neva/Pechora / SA-3 “Goa”

The SA-3 is a Soviet Radar guided Short Range SAM system developed in 1961 as a complement to the SA-2. Missiles are guided by remote command, but DCS treats them as SARHs.

S-125 Neva/Pechora / SA-3 “Goa”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SAM SR P-19 1 P-19 Danube 1RL134 / “Flat Face B” Search Radar Detection: 0.8–86.4nm / 1.5–160km
Altitude: 82–98,400ft / 25–30,000m
RWR-FF.pngPO1-Medium.png
SAM SA-3 S-125 TR SNR 1 SNR-125 UNV “Low Blow” Tracking Radar Detection: 0.8–54nm / 1.5–100km
Altitude: 82–65,600ft / 25–20,000m
RWR-3.pngRWR-LB.pngPO1-Medium.png
SAM SA-3 S-125 LN 5P73 4 5P73 4-rail Launcher 4× 5V27 Low alt. engagement: 1.9–5.9nm / 3.5–11km
High alt. engagement: 1.9–9.7nm / 3.5–18km
Altitude: 65–59,000ft / 20–18,000m
Max speed: Mach 2.2
(Unarmed) CP SKP-11 ATC Mobile Command Post (1) Radio Relay Van
(Unarmed) CP Ural-375 PBU (1-4) SNR-125 UNK Radar Operation Van
(Unarmed) GPU APA-80 on ZiL-131 (1) 5E96 Cabin Power Generator Van
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-375 (1) Transporter/transloader
(Static Cargos) ISO container small (1) Missile reloads
(Unavailable) Rapier FSA Blindfire Tracker (1) RV-10 Konus Heightfinding Radars Detection 0.3–16.2nm / 0.5–30km
Altitude: 164–13,100ft / 50–4,000m
RWR-RT.pngPO1-Short.png
Reload / rearm 10s to ready new missile; 300s reload per batch of 2 missiles;
600s total rearm time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time SR: 6s scan + 9s acquisition.
TR: 1s scan + 10s acquisition.
HFR: 1s scan + 6s acquisition.
Acquisition limits SR lock-on: 73nm / 136km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
TR lock-on: 41.3nm / 76.5km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
HFR lock-on: 11.5nm / 21.3km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
Target tracking SR can track 10 targets at a time.
TR can guide 2 missiles at a time at a single target.
Target size limit 0.18m².[1]
Sensor scan coverage SR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+45° vertical.
TR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
HFR radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
HFR optics: 360° horizontal × -3°–+70° vertical.
Time to ready 2s (all components)
Kill radius 14m
Notes
The optional components are mostly for decoration (especially the static cargo containers), although the many transport units will provide rearming functionality for the launchers.

Launchers should be placed within 70m of the central guidance area

The transporters, containers, and radio relay van should be positioned 100m away from the central guidance area (but no farther away than 200m from any launcher so as to provide reloads); the other units should be part of the central guidance area.

The Rapier Blindfire Tracker is a good visual representation of the height-finding radar, but is commonly unavailable to countries that possess the SA-3 and would probably interfere with detection mechanics if mixed in — a better solution is to add it as a Static Ground Vehicle object.

The system is static and cannot be directly driven using Combined Arms.

Available to
Algeria, from 1982 Angola, from 1981 Belarus, but only with historical units turned off Bulgaria, from 1975 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Cuba, from 1977 Czech Republic, from 1993 East Germany, from 1971 to 1990 Egypt, from 1975 Ethiopia, from 1977 Finland, from 1979 to 1991 Georgia, from 1991 Germany, from 1990 to 1994 Hungary, from 1976 to 1995 India, from 1973 Iraq, from 1972 to 2003 Kazakhstan, from 1991 Libya, from 1974 North Korea, from 1985 Poland, from 1971 Romania, from 1971 to 1998 Russia, from 1991 Serbia, from 2006 Slovakia, from 1993 to 2001 Syria, from 1972 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1970 to 1991 Venezuela, from 2011 Vietnam, from 1972 Yemen, from 1979 Yugoslavia, from 1971 to 1991
Tactics
Despite its short range, the missiles are rather manoeuvrable, and harder to shake off with fancy piloting, especially since it actually predicts the target's movement unlike the SA-2. The system is also somewhat more resistant to ECM than its predecessors, but is still rendered toothless once the track radar is defeated. It can also track at lower altitudes than its predecessors.

S-300PS / SA-10 “Grumble”

Developed in 1979, this system is one of the most dangerous SAMs in the game (and real life).

S-300PS / SA-10 “Grumble”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SAM SA-10 S-300PS CP 54K6 1 Command Post Detection: 1.1–86.4nm / 2–160km
Altitude: 16–88,600ft / 5–27,000m[3]
SAM SA-10 S-300PS SR 5N66M 1 “Clam Shell” Low-altitude Search Radar Detection: 1.1–32.4nm / 2–60km
Altitude: 16–9,800ft / 5–3,000m
RWR-CS.pngPO1-Long.png
SAM SA-10 S-300PS SR 64H6E 1 “Big Bird” Regiment Search Radar (can also locate missiles) Detection: 1.1–86.4nm / 2–160km
Altitude: 320–88,600ft / 100–27,000m
RWR-BB.pngPO1-Long.png
SAM SA-10 S-300PS TR 30N6 1 “Flap Lid A” Tracking Radar Detection: 1.1–86.4nm / 2–160km
Altitude: 82–86,600ft / 25–27,000m
RWR-10.pngPO1-Long.png
SAM SA-10 S-300PS LN 5P85C 4 Master TEL Launch vehicle 4× 5V55P Low alt. engagement: 2.7–40–21.6nm / 5–40km
High alt. engagement: 2.7–64.8nm / 5–120km
Altitude: 82–88,600ft / 25–27,000m
Max speed: Mach 5.0
SAM SA-10 S-300PS LN 5P85D 12 Slave TEL Launch vehicle
(Approximation: SAM SA-10 S-300PS CP 54K6) (?) MAZ-543M MOBD accomodation vehicle
(Unarmed) Transport KAMAZ-43101 (12) Transport and Loading
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-375 (8) Ural 375 towing tractor
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-4320T (4) Ural 4320 component tractor
(Static Cargos) ISO container (8) Missile container
(Static Structures) GeneratorF (4) 5I57 Mobile Diesel Power Generator
Reload / rearm 1800s reload per missile;
7200s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time CC: 0.1s
Low SR: 1s scan + 3s acquisition.
High SR: 1s scan + 6s acquisition.
TR: 1s scan + 6s acquisition.
Acquisition limits[5] Low SR lock-on: 119.3nm / 221km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
High SR lock-on: 91.8nm / 170km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
TR lock-on: 119.3nm / 221km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
Target tracking CP can track 15 targets at a time, fed by the high/low SR:s.
Low SR can track 15 targets at a time.
High SR can track 15 targets at a time.
TR can guide 2 missiles per target at a time; can track 5 targets at a time, designated by CP.
Target size limit: 0.049m².[1]
Sensor scan coverage Low SR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
High SR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
TR: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Time to ready: 2s (all components)
Kill radius 20m
Notes
Has significant self-defence anti-missile capability.

Firing units and decorations should be divided among 4 firing emplacements evenly (i.e. 1x Master TEL, 3x Slave TEL, 3x KAMAZ-43101, 2 Ural-375, 1 Ural 4320, 2 ISO containers)

The system is static and cannot be driven using Combined Arms.

Available to
Algeria, from 2008 Belarus, from 1991 Bulgaria, from 1989 China, from 1993 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off East Germany, from 1988 to 1990 Egypt, from 2016 Greece, from 1999 Iran, from 2016 Kazakhstan, from 1991 Russia, from 1991 Slovakia, from 1993 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1975 to 1991 Venezuela, from 2013 Vietnam, from 2005
Tactics
This is a very expensive and strategically significant air defence system, and absolutely should be backed up with shorter range systems and AAA. This system is very flexible in terms of realistic placement: it is known to inhabit old SA-2 sites (inheriting the "flower" layout), or components can believably placed as far as 21nm from the central command post.

The SA-10 is not a system to be taken lightly: it can track you and more than twenty other friends from near 0 AGL to high altitude, actively engage five different targets at once, shoot down HARMS and other missiles, and chew up dozens of aircraft in just a minute. Keeping terrain between yourself and the missile site is about the only real evasion technique. This system can realistically distribute its launchers as far as 21 nm from the command post. If a launch is detected, you may find that the fully active radar missile is approaching from a direction other than the tracking emitter. Since the missiles are fully active, defeating the track radar is not enough to save you: you have to defeat both it and the missile.

Smaller ARMs, such as the LD-10, are too small for this system to fire upon.

ZSU-23-4 Shilka

Produced through the 60's and 80's, this gun is not terribly threatening by modern standards. Despite this, it's cheap and many exist, and so can be found in many arsenals of small nations. Its quad 2A14 23mm autocannons are still able to shred just about anything it hits, out to fairly decent ranges, and the only issue is hitting to begin with.

ZSU-23-4 Shilka
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SPAAA ZSU-23-4 Shilka 4 Radar-ranging, self-propelled AAA 4×500× 23mm HE+AP Detection: 0–2.7nm / 0–5km
Detection alt.: 0–8,200ft / 0–2,500m
RWR-A.pngPO1-NA.png
Engagement: 0–1.3nm (8,200ft) / 0–2.5km
Engagement alt.:0–6,500ft / 0–2,000m
Reload / rearm RoF: 3600 rpm; 1224s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time 1s scan + 6s acquisition.
Acquisition limits Radar lock-on: 3.4nm / 6.4km. Notch: 0m/s vrad.
Sensor scan coverage Radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Aiming limits Visual: 360° horizontal × -4.5°–85° vertical.
Time to ready 4s
Kill radius N/A
Notes
Has a radar for ranging targets, but offers no search scope in Combined Arms.

Has no special unit integration or setup and is normally integrated into armoured and mechanised columns alongside 9K31 Strela-1 / SA-9 SAMs. Largely obsolete, its more modern replacement is the 2K22 Tunguska / SA-19.

Available to
Abkhazia, from 1994 Algeria, from 1979 Angola, from 1978 Belarus, from 1991 Bulgaria, from 1969 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Cuba, from 1975 East Germany, from 1969 to 1990 Egypt, from 1967 Ethiopia, from 1978 Georgia, from 1991 Germany, from 1990 to 1992 Greece, from 1994 Hungary, from 1969 India, from 1976 Insurgents, but only with historical units turned off Iran, from 1977 Iraq, from 1973 Israel, but only with historical units turned off Jordan, from 1982 Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Lebanon, from 1982 Libya, from 1977 Morocco, but only with historical units turned off North Korea, from 1979 Pakistan, from 1975 Poland, from 1968 Russia, from 1991 South Ossetia, from 2008 Syria, from 1972 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1965 to 1991 Vietnam, from 1972 Yemen, from 1979 Yugoslavia, from 1979
Tactics
By itself, it's rather pathetic. Instead, it tends to be deployed as close cover for larger SAM sites. Goon mission designers also like to stick these over objective sites to catch out people who pull out of a divebomb too low.

Just fly high and it won't hurt you. If that's not an option, you can still reasonably evade its fire by flying fast. The radar is too imprecise for most ARMs to lock onto, so if you really want to assert your dominance over this thing, a simple bomb drop will do. It should be noted that most eastern RWRs don't even bother alerting you to its radar.

On the flip-side of the coin, if driven in Combined Arms, it can actually be used to devastating effect against ground units since its ammunition is ever so slightly armour-piercing in the DCS damage model, and its round count and sheer rate of fire will chew through any amount of hit points in very short order.

Soviet doctrine is that one either one air defence battalion (6 Tunguska, 6 SA-13, 18 MANPADs) or one air defence battery (4 Shilkas, 4 SA-9/13) accompanies each motor/rifle or tank regiment.

IR-guided

Infrared missiles do not alert pilots on the RWR (though Missile Approach Warning System aircraft like the A-10 and JF-17 may still be warned of an inbound missile). While modern militaries are more than happy to proliferate and sling cheap shots with these, it is recognized that they are a big "Fuck You" to inattentive pilots, and can render a mission unfun if not used judiciously. Many goon missions limit the use IR missiles to catch out pilots who strayed from the briefed course, or as an occasional threat to catch unaware pilots.

Note that IR lock-on distances can wildly exceed or fail to meet the nominal detection ranges of their respective systems since they operate on the basis of an IR signature size that may shrink or bloom depending on aspect, throttle position, and similar factors. For AI units, this rarely makes any difference since they are bound by the sensor detection mechanics, but a player-controlled unit can conceivably be very lucky and lock up a target much sooner than expected (but it is unlikely that the missile itself will actually fly that far).

9K31 Strela-1 / SA-9 “Gaskin”

Designed in 1968, this highly mobile rear-aspect SAM is still used in the middle east to present day.

9K31 Strela-1 / SA-9 “Gaskin”
Units Qty Function Stores Range
SAM SA-9 Strela-1 9P31 1 IR-guided, self-propelled SAM 4× 9M31 Detecton: 0–2.7nm / 0–5km
Detection alt.: 0–16,400ft / 0–5,000m
Engagement: 0.4–2.3nm / 0.8–4.2km
Engagement alt.: 98–11,500ft / 30–3,500m
Max speed: Mach 1.3
Reload / rearm 1s to ready new missile; 300s reload per missile;
1200s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time 2s acquisition.
Acquisition limits IR lock-on: 5.4nm / 10km for a normalised heat source.
Sensor scan coverage IR: 360° horizontal × -3°–+70° vertical.
Aiming limits Visual: 360° horizontal × 0°–+70° vertical.
Time to ready 5s
Kill radius 2.5m
Notes
Optical acquisition rear-aspect IR homing.

Has no special unit integration or special setup and is normally integrated into armoured and mechanised columns alongside ZSU-23-4 Shilka SPAAGs.

Available to
Abkhazia, but only with historical units turned off Algeria, from 1979 Angola, from 1983 Belarus, but only with historical units turned off Bulgaria, from 1978 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Croatia, from 1991 Cuba, from 1987 East Germany, from 1979 to 1990 Egypt, from 1973 Ethiopia, from 1977 Georgia, but only with historical units turned off Germany, from 1990 to 1992 Hungary, from 1979 India, from 1980 Insurgents, but only with historical units turned off Iraq, from 1982 Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Libya, from 1979 Poland, from 1976 to 2002 Romania, from 1979 Russia, from 1991 Serbia, from 2012 South Ossetia, from 2008 Syria, from 1975 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1968 to 1991 Vietnam, from 1971 Yemen, from 1979 Yugoslavia, from 1978 to 1991
Tactics
This unit acquires targets optically, and its guidance system is limited to rear-aspect homing. Since the missiles only have a maximum speed of Mach 1.3, and still have a need to accelerate to that speed after launching, it is conceivable that the missile could be defeated simply by flying fast enough.

It is largely obsolete, but still widely in use for nations that cannot afford the upgrade — its more modern replacement is the 9K35 Strela-10M3 / SA-13.

Soviet doctrine is that one either one air defence battalion (6 Tunguska, 6 SA-13, 18 MANPADs) or one air defence battery (4 Shilkas, 4 SA-9/13) accompanies each motor/rifle or tank regiment.

9K35 Strela-10M3 / SA-13 “Gopher”

Entering service in 1976, the SA-13 is the successor to the SA-9, improving upon it with all-aspect seekers and a radar to augment its targeting capabilities.

9K35 Strela-10M3 / SA-13 “Gopher”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SAM SA-13 Strela-10M 9A35M3 4 Transporter Erector Launcher And Radar 2× 4× 9M37
10× 100× 7.62mm
Detection: 0–4.3nm / 0–8km
Detection alt.: 32–11,400ft / 10–3,500m
RWR-13.pngPO1-Short.png
Engagement: 0.5–4.3nm / 0.8–5km
Engagement alt.: 32–11,400ft / 10–3,500m
Max speed: Mach 2.0
CP 9S80M1 Sborka (0-1) PPRU-M1 / “Dog Ear” command unit Detection: 0.1–18.9nm / 0.1–35km
Altitude: 50–32,800ft / 15–10,000m
RWR-DE.pngPO1-Short.png
(Armor) APC BTR-80 (1) Mobile Command Post
(Unarmed) CP Ural-375 PBU (1) Training Simulator
(Unarmed) Transport GAZ-3308 (2) Missile Repair/test Station
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-4320T (1) Transporter/transloader
(Unarmed) Transport ZIP-131 KUNG (1) Radar Repair/test Station
Reload / rearm 1s to ready new missile; 120s reload per missile;
960s total ream time from a depleted state.
RoF: 750 rpm; 15s reload per box of 100× 7.62mm
150s total rearm time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time TELAR: 2s acquisition
CP: 1s scan + 12s acquisition.
Acquisition limits TELAR IR lock-on: 8nm / 15km for a normalised heat source.
TELAR MG lock-on: 0.5nm / 1km
CP lock-on: 16nm / 30km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
Sensor scan coverage TELAR IR: 360° horizontal × -3°–+70° vertical.
CP: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Aiming limits TELAR IR: 360° horizontal × 0°–+70° vertical.
TELAR MG: ±50° horizontal × -5°–+15° vertical.
Time to ready 5s
Kill radius 3m Countermeasure resistance factor ×2
Notes
Optical acquisition all-aspect IR homing, with a nominal range-finding radar. Most RWR systems will not show any indication of this radar.

The addition of an optional large “Dog Ear” radar component offers search capabilities at longer range but will alert the target and sacrifice the ambush capabilities of the launcher.

The system is mobile and can be directly driven using Combined Arms. Despite having a radar, it offers no search scope in Combined Arms. When controlled by a player, expect loading and rearming times to increase by ~10%.

Available to
Abkhazia, but only with historical units turned off Algeria, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Belarus, from 1991 Cuba, but only with historical units turned off Georgia, but only with historical units turned off Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Russia, from 1991 Serbia, but only with historical units turned off South Ossetia, but only with historical units turned off Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1989 to 1991
Tactics
This system improves upon its predecessor in every way: it retains extreme mobility and adds an all aspect IR seeker to its bag of tricks. It has a radar for acquisition purposes, but is perfectly capable of firing upon targets without it. The use of ECM and chaff may disrupt and delay an early acquisition but has no effect the actual launch or on missile tracking.

Soviet doctrine is that one either one air defence battalion (6 Tunguska, 6 SA-13, 18 MANPADs) or one air defence battery (4 Shilkas, 4 SA-9/13) accompanies each motor/rifle or tank regiment.

9K38 Igla / SA-18 “Grouse” and 9K338 Igla-S / SA-24 “Grinch”

The SA-18 is a Soviet Infrared guided mobile short range SAM system.

9K38 Igla, 9K338 Igla-S / SA-18 “Grouse”, SA-24 “Grinch”
Units Qty Function Stores Range
SAM SA-18 Igla  1 IR-guided MANPADS 3× 9M39 Detection: 0–2.7nm / 0–5km
Detection alt.: 0–16,400ft / 0–5,000m
Engagement: 0.3–2.4nm / 0.5–4.5km
Engagement alt.: 32–11,400ft / 10–3,500m
Max speed: Mach 2.2
SAM SA-18 Igla-S 3× 9M337
SAM SA-18 Igla comm (1) Command unit Detection: 0–2.7nm / 0–5km
Detection alt.: 0–16,400ft / 0–5,000m
SAM SA-18 Igla-S comm
CP 9S80M1 Sborka (0-1) PPRU-M1 / “Dog Ear” command unit Detection: 0.1–18.9nm / 0.1–35km
Altitude: 50–32,800ft / 15–10,000m
RWR-DE.pngPO1-Short.png
Reload / rearm 1s to ready new missile; 40s reload per missile;
120s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time 2s acquisition
CP: 1s scan + 12s acquisition.
Acquisition limits IR lock-on: 5.4nm / 10km for a normalised heat source.
CP lock-on: 16nm / 30km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
Sensor scan coverage IR: 360° horizontal × -3°–+70° vertical.
CP: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Aiming limits Visual: 360° horizontal × 360° vertical.
Time to ready 2s
Kill radius 1m Countermeasure resistance factor ×2
Notes
The commander is a static unit and cannot be driven using Combined Arms. The commander offers no clear numbers or mechanical advantage except maybe offering a second sensor scan coverage that can detect enemies in a direction the launcher unit is not currently looking.

There is no mechanical difference between the two versions other than which is available to what nation and what skins are applied to the models, but doctrinally, the Igla-S can be linked to Sborka command vehicles for early detection and coordination.

9K38 Igla / SA-18 “Grouse” Available to
Abkhazia, from 1994 Belarus, from 1991 Brazil, from 1994 Bulgaria, from 1981 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Cuba, from 1981 Egypt, from 2008 Finland, from 1990 to 2000 Georgia, from 1991 Hungary, from 1981 India, from 2001 Indonesia, from 1981 Insurgents, but only with historical units turned off Iran, from 1981 Jordan, from 2001 Kazakhstan, from 1991 Malaysia, from 1981 Mexico, from 2002 Morocco, from 1981 North Korea, from 1981 Russia, from 1991 Serbia, from 2006 Slovakia, from 2009 South Korea, from 1981 South Ossetia, from 2008 Thailand, from 1981 Turkey, from 1981 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1981-1991 Vietnam, from 2002
9K338 Igla-S / SA-24 “Grinch” Available to
Algeria, but only with historical units turned off Belarus, but only with historical units turned off Brazil, from 2010 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off China, but only with historical units turned off Cuba, but only with historical units turned off Egypt, from 2009 India, from 2008 Iran, but only with historical units turned off Iraq, from 2024 Jordan, from 2009 Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Libya, from 2006 Morocco, but only with historical units turned off Qatar, from 2018 Russia, from 2002 Serbia, but only with historical units turned off Syria, from 2008 Thailand, from 2010 Ukraine, but only with historical units turned off United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off Venezuela, from 2009
Tactics
Can be found anywhere two guys with a tube can reasonably hide, and the Soviets deployed them liberally with their ground forces. As such, these all-aspect guided units are particularly dangerous. Best avoided by staying out of range (4-5 miles, 15,000 ft). If you must cross into its engagement circle, your chances are improved by flying fast and dropping flares at a rate of about 1 per second, but be ready to evade just the same.

Most frequently integrated into infantry columns or as a supplement to any fixed installations. These days, the more modern Igla-S / SA-24 version is available to Russia and a few allies, and the SA-18 is relegated more to various older customers and insurgents.

Soviet doctrine dictates:

  • 3 MANPADS for most HQs
  • 3 MANPADS in the technical batteries in SAM units
  • 3 MANPADS per firing battery in all SAM units
  • 6 MANPDAS per artillery/MRL battery (so on average one MANPADS for every artillery piece!)
  • 9 MANPADS per motor rifle battalion
  • Within one air defence battalion (6 Tunguska, 6 SA-13, 18 MANPADs) or one air defence battery (4 Shilkas, 4 SA-9/13), which accompanies each motor/rifle or tank regiment.

Optically guided

2A13 / ZU-23-2

The direct predecessor to the ZSU-23-4 Shilka and to some extent the 57-2, this weapon continues to see use to present day. Since it's heyday in the 60's, it use has transitioned from AAA to ground fire support, and can be found rigged on the backs of many a pickup truck in third world countries.

2A13 / ZU-23-2
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
AAA ZU-23 Closed ?-6 Revetted static AAA gun 5× 2×50× 23mm Detection: 0–2.7nm / 0–5km
Detection alt.: 0–16,400ft / 0–5,000m
Engagement: 0–1.3nm (8,200ft) / 0–2.5km
Engagement alt.:0–6,500ft / 0–2,000m
AAA ZU-23 Emplacement ?-6 Employed static AAA gun
AAA ZU-23 on Ural-375 ?-6 Mobile AAA gun
AAA ZU-23 Insurgent ?-6 Revetted static AAA gun with insurgent crew
AAA ZU-23 Insurgent Closed ?-6 Employed static AAA gun with insurgent crew
AAA ZU-23 Insurgent on Ural-375 ?-6 Mobile AAA gun with insurgent crew
CP 9S80M1 Sborka (0-1) PPRU-M1 / “Dog Ear” command unit Detection: 0.1–18.9nm / 0.1–35km
Altitude: 50–32,800ft / 15–10,000m
RWR-DE.pngPO1-Short.png
Reload / rearm RoF: 1800 rpm; 10s reload time;
10s rearm per batch of 100 (50 per barrel); 50s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time 3s acquisition.
Acquisition limits Visual: 1.3nm / 2.5km.
Sensor scan coverage Visual: 360° horizontal × -15°–+70° vertical.
Aiming limits Visual: 360° horizontal × -4.5°–+85° vertical.
Time to ready 10s
Kill radius N/A
Notes
All firing units have the same offensive capabilities. The difference is mostly cosmetic, other than that the Ural-375 variants can be driven around, whereas the rest are static emplacements. All can be directly controlled using Combined Arms.

Has no special setup and is integrated into infantry or light mechanised columns, or used as static defences for fixed installations. If combined with a Sborka command vehicle, each vehicle coordinates 6 sections of ZU-23:s.

Available to
Abkhazia, but only with historical units turned off Algeria, from 1960 Belarus, from 1991 China, from 1960 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Cuba, from 1960 East Germany, from 1960 Ethiopia, from 1960 Finland, from 1960 Georgia, from 1991 Greece, from 1960 Hungary, from 1960 India, from 1960 Indonesia, from 1960 Insurgents, but only with historical units turned off Iran, from 1869 Iraq, from 1960 Israel, from 1960 Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Lebanon, from 1960 Libya, from 1960 Morocco, from 1960 Namibia, from 1960 Oman, but only with historical units turned off Pakistan, from 1960 Poland, from 1960 Rhodesia, from 1965 Russia, from 1991 Serbia, but only with historical units turned off South Africa, from 1960 South Ossetia, from 2008 Syria, from 1960 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1960 to 1991 Venezuela, from 1960 Vietnam, from 1960 Yemen, from 1960
Tactics
As with the Shilka, just don't get too low while you clown on it and you'll be fine.

2K22 Tunguska / SA-19 “Grison”

This combination AAA and missile system was designed in the 70's to replace the Shilka and counter new threats like the A-10. Since it's first deployment in 1982, it has been used to provide all-weather day and night protection to infantry and tank regiments against CAS threats and cruise missiles.

2K22 Tunguska / SA-19 “Grison”
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
SAM SA-19 Tunguska 2S6 6 Self-propelled AAA and SACLOS-guided Missile 8× 9M311
2×968× 30mm HE/AP
Detection: 0.1–9.7nm / 0.2–18km
Detection alt.: 0–11,400ft / 0–3,500m
RWR-S6.pngPO1-Short.png
Engagement 1.1–4.3nm / 2–8km (9M311)
Engagement alt.:47–11,400ft / 14.5–3,500m
Max speed: Mach 2.82
Engagement: 0–1.9nm / 0–3.5km (30mm)
Engagement alt.: 0–9,800ft / 0–3,000m
CP 9S80M1 Sborka (0-1) PPRU-M1 / “Dog Ear” command unit Detection: 0.1–18.9nm / 0.1–35km
Altitude: 50–32,800ft / 15–10,000m
RWR-DE.pngPO1-Short.png
(Unarmed) Transport GAZ-3308 (1) Repair/test Station
(Unarmed) Transport KAMAZ-43101 (3) Transporter/transloader
(Unarmed) Transport Ural-4320-31 Armored (3) Repair/test/assembly Station
(Unarmed) Transport ZIL-131 KUNG (1) Mobile Workshop
Reload / rearm 1s to ready new missile; 120s reload per missile;
960s total missile ream time from a depleted state.
RoF: 4500 rpm; 1536s total gun rearm time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time 9M311: 1s scan + 5s acquisition
30mm: 3s
CP: 1s scan + 12s acquisition.
Acquisition limits Radar “lock-on”: 8.2nm / 15.3km. Notch: <10m/s (19kts, 36km/h) vrad.
Visual: 2.7nm / 5km.
CP lock-on: 16nm / 30km. Notch: <15m/s (29kts, 54km/h) vrad.
Target tracking Can guide 1 missile at a time at a single target.
Target size limit 0.1m².[1]
Sensor scan coverage Radar: 360° horizontal × -5°–+60° vertical.<br/Visual: 360° horizontal × -15°–+80° vertical.
CP: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Aiming limits Visual: 360° horizontal × -10°–+87° vertical.
Time to ready 2s
Kill radius 5m Countermeasure resistance factor Not affected by countermeasures
Notes
The radar “lock-on” stat is effectively just a range increase and firing delay for the missiles for AI units — there is no traditional lock that can be jammed, chaffed, or otherwise broken, nor will it generate any kind of lock-on or launch warning. The system can effectively engage anything it can detect, but its own built-in detection is limited to optical and relatively short-range, not terribly high-resolution radar. If paired with more capable sensors, it can engage even more difficult targets.

The system is mobile and can be directly driven using Combined Arms.

Available to
Abkhazia, but only with historical units turned off Belarus, from 1991 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Morocco, but only with historical units turned off Russia, from 1991 South Ossetia, from 2008 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1982 to 1991
Tactics
This unit has pretty decent range and can be a dire threat against CAS aircraft, such as the A-10 and Harrier. It's mobility and ability to forgo the radar makes it difficult to target with a SEAD strike, scripters and human drivers might take advantage of this with a shoot and scoot strategy.

Best targeted with high-altitude laser guided weaponry. Note that missiles are optically guided and cannot be defeated by countermeasures: you must manoeuvre to lose them.

Soviet doctrine is that one either one air defence battalion (6 Tunguska, 6 SA-13, 18 MANPADs) or one air defence battery (4 Shilkas, 4 SA-9/13) accompanies each motor/rifle or tank regiment.

ZSU-57-2

A post-WWII self-propelled anti-aircraf gun (SPAAG), this two-barrelled, 57mm piece can be a pretty nasty surprise since it is essentially the post-war reincarnation of the anti-bomber flak cannon, and can reach surprisingly high altitudes — upwards of 13,000ft, and giving off no warning until the sky starts exploding. It is still optically guided so accuracy will not be stellar no matter what, but it can and will catch anyone who lazily flies straight and level within its operational range.

ZSU-57-2
Units Qty Function Stores Range / Symbol
AAA ZSU-57-2 1 Optically guided, self-propelled AAA 15× 2×4× 57mm HE-T
7× 2×4× 57mm APCBC-HE-T
Detection: 0–5.4nm / 0–10km
Detection alt.: 0–16,400ft / 0–5,000m
Engagement: 0–3.7nm / 0–7km
Engagement alt.: 0–13,100ft / 0–4,000m
Reload / rearm RoF: 240 rpm; 4s reload time;
4s rearm per batch of 8 (4 per barrel); 60 + 28s total ream time from a depleted state.
Acquisition time 3s acquisition.
Acquisition limits Visual: 3.7nm / 7km.
Sensor scan coverage Visual: 360° horizontal × -15°–+70° vertical.
Aiming limits Visual: 360° horizontal × -10°–+88° vertical.
Time to ready 2s
Kill radius N/A
Notes

Has no special unit integration or setup and is normally integrated into armoured and mechanised columns,

Available to
Algeria, from 1975 Angola, from 1975 Bulgaria, from 1965 Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Cuba, from 1963 East Germany, from 1957 to 1990 Egypt, from 1961 Ehiopia, from 1978 Finland, from 1960 to 2006 Hungary, from 1966 Iran, from 1967 to 2010 Iraq, from 1971 to 2003 North Korea, from 1968 Poland, from 1957 to 1999 Romania, from 1965 to 1998 Russia, from 1991} Syria, from 1967 Ukraine, from 1991 United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1955 to 1991 Vietnam, from 1971 Yugoslavia, from 1960 to 1991

Early-warning / GCI systems

These units can be turned into ground-based GCI radars by assigning the advanced waypoint actions:

  • Start Enroute Task > EWR
  • Perform Command > Set Callsign
  • Perform Command > Set Frequency

They are all static units and cannot be driven using Combined Arms, but offer detection capabilities that tie into the more realistic simulation modes of LotATC 4 DCS. The editor detection ring displays an artificial limit of how far detection scripting will report a target; actual ranges for the EWR task should be much longer, but have been bugged for years.[6]

1L13-3 Nebo-SV “Box Spring”

The GRAU index would imply that this is a 1 = radio and electonics equipment, L = IFF system.

1L13-3 Nebo-SV “Box Spring”
Units Function Stores Range / Symbol
EWR 1L13 Early-Warning Radar Detection: 0–64.8nm / 0–120km
Altitude: 0–98,400ft / 0–30,000m
RWR-S.pngPO1-EWR.png
Acquisition time 1s scan + 12s acquisition.
Acquisition limits Radar: 55nm / 102km. Notch: <50m/s (97kts, 180km/h) vrad.
Target tracking Can track 10 targets at a time.
Target size limit: 0.18m².[1]
Sensor scan coverage Radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Time to ready 2s
Notes
Has no offensive or defensive capabilities beyond what air assets it can guide towards a threat, and should be paired with layered AA and ground assets for protection. Is supposed to have a 162nm / 300km detection range for the purpose of providing GCI, but is seemingly limited to the 120km set by the sensor definition.
Available to
Algeria, but only with historical units turned off Belarus, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Georgia, but only with historical units turned off Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Russia, from 1991 Serbia, but only with historical units turned off Ukraine, but only with historical units turned off United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1986 to 1991

55ZH6 Nebo “Tall Rack”

The GRAU index would imply that this is an in-atmosphere interception air-defence system (index 55).

55ZH6 Nebo “Tall Rack”
Units Function Stores Range / Symbol
EWR 55G6 Early-Warning Radar Detection: 0–64.8nm / 0–120km
Altitude: 0–98,400ft / 0–30,000m
RWR-S.pngPO1-EWR.png
Acquisition time 1s scan + 12s acquisition.
Acquisition limits Radar: 55nm / 102km. Notch: <50m/s (97kts, 180km/h) vrad.
Target tracking Can track 10 targets at a time.
Target size limit: 0.18m².[1]
Sensor scan coverage Radar: 360° horizontal × -15°–+60° vertical.
Time to ready 2s
Notes
Has no offensive or defensive capabilities beyond what air assets it can guide towards a threat, and should be paired with layered AA and ground assets for protection. Is supposed to have a 215nm / 400km detection range for the purpose of providing GCI, but is seemingly limited to the 120km set by the sensor definition.
Available to
Algeria, but only with historical units turned off Belarus, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Blue, but only with historical units turned off Combined Joint Task Force Red, but only with historical units turned off Kazakhstan, but only with historical units turned off Russia, from 1991 Ukraine, but only with historical units turned off United Nations Peacekeepers, but only with historical units turned off USAF Aggressors, but only with historical units turned off USSR, from 1986 to 1991

Notes

  1. 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 Compare, effective target sizes:
    • Small: Vikhr: 0.012m² · AGM-114: 0.015m² · AGM-122: 0.03m² · BGM-71 / LD-10: 0.033m²
    • Medium: AGM-88 / C-701 0.05m² · Kh-23 / Kh-25 / Kh-66: 0.06m² · AGM-154 0.05–0.062m³ · AGM-65 / Rb-75: 0.063m² · LS-6: 0.07m² · C-802 / AGM-45: 0.09m²
    • Large: GB-6 / Kh-35: 0.1m² · Kh-58 / Rb-04 / Rb-05 / Rb-15 / Sea Eagle: 0.12m² · AGM-84: 0.08–0.17m² · AGM-86 / Kh-65: 0.17m² · Kh-29: 0.18m² · Kh-59: 0.2m² · Kh-31: 0.3m² · BK-90: 0.4m²
    • OMFG: ADM-141: 0.9–1.2m² · Kh-22: 1.82m² ·
  2. A 9T217 OSA transloader vehicle is defined in the vehicle database but is not assigned to any nations and cannot be accessed or added in the mission editor.
  3. 3.0 3.1 This unit has its own detection statistics for the purpose of determining search and Target tracking, but depends on the availability of a linked search radar to actually allow target detection.
  4. The lock-on limit depends heavily on the target aspect, with head-on, look-up targets being easier to lock.
  5. According to the measuring distance and lock-on distance coefficient in the data files, this system can actually lock targets beyond its detection range. This is possibly intended to simulate data linking capabilities where “legitimate” locks can be maintained beyond the individual unit's own range. Actual engagement still requires the target to be within detection range of at least one emitter.
  6. See https://forums.eagle.ru/topic/185446-already-reportedewr-and-getdetectedtargets/ for a discussion on the scripting engine bug(?) / limitations.